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Introduction
The last few years have seen a surge of interest in the properties of the interbank market and formal modelling of interbank connections via models and methods of network theory. The major motivation for the emergence of this new research area have been the events unfolding in 2008 and beyond after the default of Lehman Brothers. As it appeared (and the same danger was lurking around the corner in minor local crises like the Greek and Cyprian debt crises), the breakdown of one major (or even minor) component of the international financial system could have led to hitherto unexpected domino effects via a variety of contagion channels culminating in the complete collapse of the worldwide financial system. In the political arena, this has led to the awareness of the importance of systemic risk and a shift from the micro prudential framework of former Basle Accords to attempts to include systemic risk factors in a new macro-prudential regulatory framework. Academic scientists, policymakers and the public realised that the inner life of the banking sector had been very much of a blank spot in many respects: neither had there been much data available on the size and distribution of activity within the banking sector, nor had economists shown much interest in this component of the economic system, or had developed particular models to explain its activity.
As of 2008, the pertinent literature consisted of a handful of empirically oriented, data-analytical papers driven by natural scientists' interest to study large data sets from a network perspective (Boss et portfolio exposures to overall systemic risk. In particular, they document, how for a sample of the largest European banks, systemic risk under joint modelling of both channels often turns out to be more than the sum of both components considered in isolation. In the light of this literature, an overall aim in this paper is to provide a foundation for the addition of another layer of network structure, namely, joint exposures via loans extended to non-financial firms. While this is somehow similar to portfolio overlaps, the network structure generated by such joint credits might be different as the majority of firms typically does not have credit connections to more than two banks, while portfolio synchronisation might be much more common. However, as we will see, the resulting sparseness of the bipartite network characteristic of bank-firm loans does not imply that it is of less relevance from the viewpoint of contagious spread of stress.
The plan of the remainder of this paper is the following: In sec.2 we will review basic stylized facts inferred from comprehensive data sets of bank-firm loans for economies like the Italian and the Japanese. We will then propose a stochastic model for generating a bipartite network that shares these stylized facts and also is in line with the typically very heterogeneous, right-tailed distribution of firm and bank sizes. In sec.3, we will introduce joint credit exposure towards the non-bank corporate sector along with interbank credit into a model of the banking sector with fully articulated balance sheet structures. In sec. 4 we use this multi-layer network model to study the effect of defaults of single business firms on the overall system, and compare the relative contribution of bank-firm and bank-bank credits to the spread of defaults through the system. Thereby, interbank contagion works via the standard mechanism of defaults of interbank loans causing losses in the creditor banks, while we assume that a bank default spills over to the company sector via the loss of funding for the banks' borrowers. Sec. 5 concludes. A technical Appendix details the condition for emergence of a large connected component in our network of bank-firm credit connections that is crucial for potentially system-wide contagious effects.
Construction of a Realistic Bipartite Credit

Network between Banks and Firms
In order to capture another important layer of contagion effects in the financial sector, joint exposures via credit to the same set of borrowers should be included into standard contagion models that so far lack this important channel. To this end, a consistent and realistic bipartite network structure for loans from banks to firms of the real sector of the economy needs to be designed. Some basic plausible stylized facts can be inferred from the analysis of a comprehensive Italian data set by de Masi and Gallegati (2012):
1. The distribution of degrees in this bipartite network is much wider for banks than for firms. For instance, they find the mean for firms to be 1.8 and for banks to be 149, respectively. The maximum number of links of firms as borrowers is 15 while on the lending side the most active bank reports 6899 credit relationships.
2. The number of links, while heterogeneous, is size dependent for both banks and firms: there are small banks that basically provide credit to mostly such companies that themselves have few lenders while also large hubs exist among banks with a multitude of lending relationships to the corporate sector. In particular, the average number of degrees for both banks and firms are very close to the Italian case, while at the extremes of the degree distribution a larger maximum degree for firms and a smaller maximum degree for banks is found.
In the following, we develop a simple simulation algorithm that is designed to capture the basic design principles of this heterogeneous bipartite network. As in . However, we also assume that these average degrees do not apply uniformly, but are the means of heterogeneous linking probabilities both across banks and firms that are increasing with their balance sheet size.
For banks, the balance sheet sizes are assumed to be random draws from a truncated Pareto distribution, i.e. total assets A i , i = 1, 2, . . . , N b are distributed as:
with L and H the minimum and maximum of the support and α the Pareto index.
The simplest way to allow for a dependency of the number of links of a unit on its size is to assume that the degrees are distributed proportionally to the balance sheets sizes, i.e. bank i (i = 1, 2, . . . , N b ) has an expected degree:
This can be achieved in the following way: let us assume that the degrees are random draws from a Poisson distribution. Then, the average expected degree across the population of banks could be written as:
We see that the constantλ b is simply obtained as: We now turn to the firm sector and construct its distribution of loan sizes and degrees so as to be consistent with those obtained for banks and the stylized facts reported above. First of all, the mean loan size of firms can be obtained
where θ is the (average) fraction of external assets (here only loans to firms) in banks' balance sheets.
Assuming that the firm size distribution (and with it the distribution of loans) follows a Pareto distribution with the same shape parameter α as for banks, we can obtain a truncated Pareto distribution for firms by using this mean together with a lower threshold l and upper threshold h obtained in the same way:
Our assumption of a larger number of firms than banks guarantees that the truncated distribution of loans by firms lies to the left of the one we had used for banks.
Having obtained the parameters of the loan size distribution, l, h, and α, we randomly draw the individual realizations for the ensemble of firms, and, again similar to the previous approach for banks, determine the number of links of each firm j, j = 1, 2, ..., N f , by Poisson draws with parameters:
where λ f is the average degree across all firms (1.8 in de Masi and Gallegati) andB i is the average (total) loan size across firms.
Both the resulting numbers for the sum of degrees over all banks and firms, respectively, as well as the total amount of loans from the perspective of both lenders and borrowers should be in rough agreement as their expectations are the same in our stochastic framework. Since both are realizations of stochastic numbers, they will, of course, not be exactly identical in any realization of this system. We provide for consistency by taking the minimum of the aggregate links of banks and firms, and add connections one after the other by following the approach of the so-called static model for scale-free networks (Goh et al.,
2001
): we first assign to each node (bank or firm) a weight according to the realization of its degree. We, then, choose randomly one node from the weighted ensemble of banks and a second one from the weighted ensemble of firms and connect these. The pool of potential links is then reduced by the two stumps that we have used from the distribution of degrees of banks and firms to form this link, and we proceed in the same fashion with all remaining links until the minimum of available links from either banks' or firms' side is exhausted.
Finally, we divide the total loan amount of a bank to its multiple borrowers proportionally to their loan sizes obtained from the Pareto distribution of firms.
This preserves the relative increase of degrees with loan sizes across firms while the exact numbers would, of course, not exactly add up to the pertinent loan positions of banks that have been generated by independent random draws. with a large connected component containing the majority of links. However, these singlets are simply those firms whose random Poisson draws were equal to zero, i.e., they have not been assigned any credit relationships from the outset.
If we would modify the model in a way to impose at least one loan for each firm, then they would likely also belong to the large connected component.
Note that the average number of loans per firms is λ f = 2. Despite this very restricted average number of connections from firms to the banking sector, we find a network structure that practically amounts to a complete graph for both sectors of the economy. The Appendix shows that one could expect the existence of a giant connected component in our bipartite network generation algorithm with the chosen parameter values, and indeed for any typical combination of This model allows for the following aggregate categories of assets and liabilities: On the liability side, it distingushes between equity (e i ), deposits (d i ) and interbank borrowing (b i ) so that total liabilities I i of bank i can be written as:
Assets are simply broken down into interbank loans (l i ) and external assets (x i ) so that total assets A i are given as:
In the approach of Montagna and Lux (2013) 
will determine the probability of an interbank credit link existing between i and k (a 1 , a 2 , d being parameters, and A max the balance sheet size of the largest bank). A second binary draw of a ik ∈ {0, 1} with probabilities 1 − p ik and p ik , respectively, will then determine whether the link will be created or not in the simulation.
We assume that the relative size of external assets and interbank loans are fixed at proportions θ and 1 − θ of the total balance sheet size:
and that, given the realization of the link structure a ik of the interbank network, the breakdown of interbank loans is determined via:
under the constraint that k l ik = l i , where l ik is the credit extended from bank i to k. Eq. (12) assumes that banks with a higher balance sheet size will also exchange a higher volume of credit. The overall allocation of interbank credits, of course, also defines the liability side of the interbank market, b i , and the system is closed by deposits as the residual of the book-keeping operations while equity is fixed as a certain percentage of the overall balance sheet size.
The most important characteristic of this generating mechanism is that the resulting interbank network shares the stylized fact of disassortativity, i.e. a negative correlation between the degrees of connected banks i and k. Hence, there will be typically nodes with high degrees connected with partners with a relatively low degree while the association of similarly active banks will be observed less frequently. This is in conformity with some banks (mostly large banks) assuming the role of money center banks, and the disassortative mixing also seems in harmony with recent findings of a core-periphery structure of the banking network (Craig and von Peter, 2014; Fricke and Lux, 2014).
Simulation Details
We now conduct a series of computational experiments to scrutinize the stability or vulnerability of the system defined in Sec. 
Contagion through Joint Exposures
We are now ready to study the relevance of the firm-bank network as a channel for the propagation of shocks. While previous studies have typically studied the effect of a complete or percentage failure of the external assets of one or more banks, in our framework we can distinguish more specifically between different sources of such a shock. In particular, it suggests itself to led a shock to the system consist in the default of a single firm in the network. We will go through the whole corporate sector and consider the default of each firm and its aftereffects one after the other. Note that in doing so we also allow for interbank contagion if one of the creditor banks of the defaulted firm does not survive the shock itself. This will actually be a rare result in our network because of the different numbers of banks and firms, and, therefore, the relatively minor importance of any borrower from the corporate sector for any bank.
Nevertheless, a small fraction of induced defaults of banks is happening 3 . We allow then for aftereffects not only in the banking sector, but also for a feedback to the corporate sector in that the borrowers of defaulted banks may default themselves because of lack of funding. We assume that firms will fail, if their available funding drops below a certain percentage of their ex-ante credit volume due to defaults of one or more creditor banks. Like interbank contagion this second channel might unfold over a number of rounds. For instance, a firm might survive the first round of knock-on effects even if one of its creditors defaults, but the missing funding is relatively small. However, as the shock spreads through the system, another creditor bank of the same firm might go out of business, and the cumulative loss of funding components could become too high for the firm so that it eventually is driven into default. In this way, multiple rounds of domino effects are possible in principle.
While defaults of firms due to discontinuance of funding are modelled here in a relatively simple fashion, any alternation of it (default with a certain probability, positive recovery value) would just change the quantitative outcome, not the qualitative effects. Dependency of bank defaults on the required fraction of continuing funding. "Mean full" and "Max full" denote the average and maximum aftereffects to single firm defaults in the complete system. The labels "banks" and "firms" identify those cases in which after the initial shock only interbank contagion or bank-firm contagion is considered, respectively. How much does interbank contagion and how much contagion through the bank-firm network contribute to this outcome? Fig. 9 shows the same scenario as in Fig. 5 together with the outcome of the contagious process with either only the interbank network or the bank-firm network activated.
As it turns out, it is the bank-firm funding channel that basically determines the results. The standard bank-bank contagion contributes a small number of defaults and it seems unable in our setting to trigger a full-scale collapse.
The same can be inferred under variation of the required fraction of continuing funding in Fig. 8 . This is in contrast to the results of Montagna and Lux (2013).
The reason is that mostly any borrower's default wipes out only a small portion of a bank's equity (while in Montagna and Lux, the shock consists in a complete loss of all external assets). An initial bank default happens when one borrower makes up a large portion of a bank's portfolio. This default spreads more easily via the funding channel (since most firms rely on few creditors), while losses in the interbank market are much more broadly distributed and are more easily covered by the other banks. equity ratio of about 7.4 percent will be needed to make the system safe against a complete breakdown, if only firm-bank connections were considered. Again, interbank credit does not add much to systemic risk in the present setting. Figure 9 : Dependency of bank defaults on the fraction of external assets in banks' balance sheets. "Mean full" and "Max full" denote the average and maximum aftereffects to single firm defaults in the complete system (same as Fig. 5 ). The labels "banks" and "firms" identify those cases in which after the initial shock only interbank contagion or bank-firm contagion is considered, respectively. Figure 10 : Dependency of bank defaults on the equity ratio of banks. Again, the effects in the complete system and in systems with one contagion channel only are displayed. Labels have the same meaning as in Fig. 9 .
The last figure show the sensitivity of the system behaviour towards some of its deep parameters. Fig. 11 considers the simultaneous variation of both the Pareto indices of the bank size and firm size distribution. As can be seen, contagion eventually dies out when the heterogeneity of the sizes of the entities in both sectors is reduced. While this effect is completely monotonic for firms, a slight hump can be observed for banks when moving from a very heterogeneous system (α = 1) to higher values. This non-monotonicity might be due to the probability distribution for the generation of interbank links which leads to a sparse matrix when applied to a very heterogeneous distribution of bank sizes (cf. Montagna und Lux, 2013) . Overall, however, a system with more equally sized units appears more favourable for the stability of the system. The reason is very likely that with more homogeneous sizes, all mutual exposures become so small that knock-on effects become more and more improbable, and hence the detrimental activation of cumulative contagion channels can be avoided. Figure 11 : Dependency of bank default rates on the distribution of firm and bank sizes. Both size distributions are assumed to to follow a truncated Pareto law with shape parameters allowed to vary between 1 and 10.
Conclusion
We have provided a stochastic model of network generation for credit linkages between the financial sector and non-financial firms based upon well-known and plausible stylized facts confirmed by recent studies using comprehensive data sets for a number of indistrialized countries. We have embedded this network into a model of interbank credit similarly based upon the stylized facts of pertinent data, and have explored the potential of this multi-layer system to give rise to contagious domino effects spreading throughout the entire system.
The results show a distinctively dichotomic behaviour of this system: After the default of a single unit from the real economy, the system either shows practically no repercussions at all, or, if some domino stones are starting to jiggle they will drag all others with them. Note that this happens beyond a certain threshold defined by the parameters of the system (low equity ratio in particular) beyond which the system appears completely safe. But if it is in a vulnerable state, its fragility expresses itself in the lurking danger of a systemwide breakdown occurring with small probability, rather than disruptions of f 0 (s) and g 0 (s) for banks' and firms' degree distributions, respectively:
We can immediately verify that the distribution is correctly normalized since 
We see that for s = 1, this equation boils down to the formula for the mean of the Pareto distribution, and hence:
and similar for g 0 (1) where both mean values are finite only if α > 1 holds.
Randomly choosing one edge (connection), the distribution of the remaining edges of the vertex that belongs to it is: 
and similarly for g 1 (s).
Connecting both parts of the bipartite network, the degree distribution of the banks to which the firms from a randomly drawn bank-firm link are connected, is given by (cf. Newman et al., 2001 ):
With the help of this function, one can determine whether, given the parameters, connectivity in the system is high enough to give rise to a so-called giant component, i.e. a cluster that includes via indirect linkages most of the two categories of vertices (i.e., banks and firms). In this case, distress could easily expand from local origins to the whole system and lead to a system-wide breakdown of activity.
A joint component forms first when G 1 (1) = 1 holds, and prevails for G 1 (1) > 1 in general. To elaborate on this condition, we apply the chain rule of differentiation:
We easily obtain: 
We, then, obtain:
With appropriate normalisation, the integrals define the second moment of the Pareto distribution so that we arrive at:
Since E[λ 
